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THIS CHAPTER EXPLORES how international standards are likely to be used for either dis-embedding or re-embedding transnational markets in the service economy. Standards refer here to voluntary 
technical specifications explicitly documented and published for orga-
nising the production and the exchange of goods and services. While a 
number of them are defined within the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) framework, others result from agreements reached 
within private consortia such as the new DVD format of the Blu-Ray Disc 
Association. They all codify, in one way or another, technical specifica-
tions regarding the measurement, design, performances, or side effects 
of products, industrial processes, or services, which affect virtually every 
aspect of our daily lives. Both steel or condom resistance is standardised 
and thousands of standards define the inter-operability of computers, 
credit cards and mobile phones. The few studies which have specifically 
focused on the role of international standards in the service sector share 
the assumption that, although they were almost non-existent until very 
recently, their significance is  likely to surge with the greater importance 
of services and the internationalisation of activities previously provided 
on a domestic basis.1 This view strongly echoes positions upheld by high-
ranking officials of standardisation bodies. When asked what fields of 
standardisation will be the most active in the coming years, Alan Bryden, 
* This chapter draws on a project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) 
(grant PP001-110528). I am grateful to the SNF for its support and Christophe Hauert for 
research assistance.
1 ‘Service sectors turn to standards’, (2006) 3 ISO Focus, 7–40; K Blind, Standards in the 
Service Sector: An Explorative Study (European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General, 
2003); CHESSS Consortium, Consolidated Report on the Feasibility Study in Response to EU 
Mandate M/ 371 (CEN’s Horizontal European Services Standardisation Strategy, 2009).
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former ISO Secretary General, was straightforward in stating that ‘one 
of our biggest challenges is precisely how to address the service sector’.2 
While standards supposedly seek greater rationality and coherence in 
distinct industries and services, all of them involve ongoing struggles 
in complex configurations of power, which involve such actors as multi-
national enterprises, organised interests, and state regulators.
Scholarly research on standards has so far mainly been confined to 
engineering, business, and economic studies on technical innovation 
and market structure. These studies tend to downplay the importance 
of international standards in the rules governing the world economy. 
While recent social and political science studies have begun to look more 
closely at the issue, they often rely, on rational choice and game theories 
to formalise systematic explanations of collective action and conflicts of 
distribution in the institutional framework which grants standardisation a 
new role in the world economy.3 Among the few studies that have shifted 
their attention towards the larger patterns of authority which mediate 
between the political and economic spheres, the focus is primarily on 
product and management systems standards.4 As attention has began to 
focus on governance issues in the world economy, it is worth drawing 
on globalisation studies which emphasise the role of non-state actors in 
the closely-integrated relationship between states and markets in such a 
context.5 Although in its infancy, there is a burgeoning literature in the 
field of international relations and global political economy, which analy-
ses the connection between the freedom of private actors to set technical 
specifications, and the institutional framework required to impose some 
order on these practices on a transnational basis.6
By relying on global political economy approaches which try to uncover 
structural power relations exercised on a transnational basis, this chapter 
extends to the area of service standards the assumption that the process 
of globalisation is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression 
2 Personal interview with the author, Geneva, 8 June 2007.
3 W Mattli (ed), ‘Governance and International Standards Setting’, (2001) 8 Special Issue of 
the Journal of European Public Policy.
4 C Murphy and J Yates, The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), (London: 
Routledge, 2008); K Tamm Hallström, Organizing International Standardization, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004); N Brunsson and B Jacobsson, A World of Standards, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
5 K van der Pijl, L Assassi and D Wigan (eds), Global Regulation, (London: Palgrave, 2004); 
K-G Giesen and K van der Pijl (eds), Global Norms in the Twenty-First Century, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006); S Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights, (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).
6 J-C Graz and A Nölke (eds), Transnational Private Governance and its Limits, (London: 
Routledge, 2008); AC Cutler, V Haufler and T Porter (eds), Private Authority and International 
Affairs, (New York: SUNY Press, 1999); H Krause Hansen and D Salskov-Iversen (eds), 
Critical Perspectives on Private Authority and Global Politics, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008).
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of both of them, which includes new patterns and agents of structural 
change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. It 
shares the assumption made by scholars of legal pluralism that global 
standardisation processes reflect ‘among the most important sources 
of global law’.7 While studies in legal pluralism attempt to establish 
how such private regulatory practices can meet acceptable criteria, in 
particular, within the European and World Trade Organization (WTO) 
framework, this chapter focuses on the power and social configurations 
underlying the phenomenon. From a Polanyian perspective, understand-
ing the rise of international standards in the global political economy 
of services calls for appraising more systematically the significance of 
technical specifications among the wide range of tools forged to embed 
and dis-embed transnational markets. Service standards epitomise an 
institutional innovation which is supposed to respond to the distinct sen-
sitivity of society in trading services. As Krajewski shows in this volume, 
the availability, provision and use of services all rely on social constructs 
with intrinsic limits to their dis-embeddedness from society. Some rely on 
public services, others raise the concerns of consumer protection or relate 
to security matters involving liability issues for users and providers alike.
While Schepel considers that standards may constitute a ‘useful and 
meaningful framework of deliberative supranationalism’,8 this chapter 
qualifies the argument by showing that both the ambivalent status of 
the private and public actors involved and the inclination to intermingle 
physical measures with societal values are likely to re-inforce the com-
modification of services and their dis-embedding from societal concerns. 
It argues that service standards reflect the significant development of a 
form of transnational hybrid authority which undermines the functional 
differentiation between the different spheres of society, and re-inforces 
the potential of political capture in the deliberative process of regulatory 
practices in contemporary capitalism.
The chapter begins with some background on the service sector, service 
standards, and, more generally, the international standardisation in goods 
and services. It then fleshes out the theoretical framework along which 
it analyses service standards as a form of transnational hybrid author-
ity, with a particular emphasis on how the rise of standards impinges 
upon bureaucratic practices and state law. Finally, the chapter examines, 
on an empirical basis, the institutional setting of the emerging power of 
service standards in the ISO context and at European level. The conclusion 
summarises the argument.
7 G Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State, (Aldershot: Ashgate-Dartmouth Publishing, 
1997) 3; H Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 8.
8 Schepel, ibid, 413.
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II. SERVICE, GLOBALISATION AND 
STANDARDISATION—BACKGROUND
The growing significance of the service economy has become a promi-
nent feature in the current structural change towards a knowledge-based 
global economy. Services now account for more than 70 per cent of GDP 
and employment in the advanced economies of the OECD, and for more 
than 50 per cent in the developing as well as in the central and eastern 
European countries. The significance of services not only pertains to their 
growing share in the economy and their close connection to technology 
and knowledge, but is also related to their swift internationalisation and 
to an important regulatory reform. Many services now supplied on a 
commercial basis used to be predominantly provided by the state in the 
form of public utilities and social services. Krajewski and Batura anal-
yse, in this volume, the prominent examples of telecommunications and 
health services; other major cases in point are transport and education. 
Even though privatised, these services have remained regulated by state 
bureaucracies, and by corporate standards emanating from management 
decisions and industrial specialisation, or from domestic standard-setting 
bodies. The internationalisation of services challenges these national 
regulatory arrangements. It is in this context that international voluntary 
standards come into play.
The ability to subordinate the delivery of services to the requirements 
of a global market is not just a matter of suitable technology designed for 
a distinct economic logic. It also supposes an ability to define the gradual 
decomposition of complex work into sequences of more simple work. The 
more fragmented the nature of the labour and consumption processes is, 
the more requirements there are to codify them. This is why services are 
often described as intrinsically resisting relocation.9 Intangible and inter-
personal services, such as teaching, consulting, and health and personal 
services, are conventionally seen as the most difficult services to move 
offshore, industrialise and standardise. According to Blind, one of the 
few economists specifically carrying out research on service standards, 
it is precisely ‘because of the intangible nature of services and the infor-
mation asymmetries thus caused between management and service 
provider, [that] the need to introduce quality standards for each stage of 
9 R Dossani, ‘Globalization and the offshoring of services: the case of India’, in L Brainard 
and SM Collins (eds), Brookings Trade forum 2005: Offshoring White-Collar Work, (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); C Du Tertre, ‘Activités immatérielles et relationnelles: 
quels nouveaux enjeux de régulaton pour les secteurs et les territoires?’, (2002) 4 Géographie, 
Economie, Société, 181–204; C Du Tertre, ‘Intangible and Interpersonal Services: Toward New 
Political Economy Tools. The French Case’, (1999) 19 Service Industries Journal, 18–34.
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the service production is especially high’.10 Micro-economic approaches 
value standards as a means of lowering the uncertainty in quality and 
security, which characterises a large portion of the service economy. In 
this view, standards positively affect the production and the competitive 
environment of services as they lower the level of suspicion regarding 
their nature and their use.
However, the logic at work in defining standards dedicated to the 
provision of services on a transborder basis is not confined to the 
micro-economic realm. Service standards have gained significance in 
the structural transformations of contemporary capitalism. By linking 
the global marketplace to distinct national economies, international ser-
vice standards respond to the conflicting understanding of quality and 
security uncertainties. On the one hand, they can promote a broadening 
and deepening of minimal market rules; on the other, they can include a 
number of provisions with the aim of defining a number of socially- or 
environmentally-based specifications likely to be crucial for the proper 
delivery or usage of distinct services. In Polanyian terms, they relate to 
overlapping moments in which dis-embedding and re-embedding forces 
diverge in their response to the role of market mechanisms in society.11 
This prompts us to explore further the extent to which international stan-
dards reflect a distinct form of market power in the reorganisation of the 
global economy towards services.
Long before current national and international standardisation bodies 
existed, mercantilist authors emphasised a peculiar juncture between 
market freedom and the protection of international exchanges. In contrast 
to many conventional accounts of mercantilism, Perrotta makes it clear 
that the use value of the goods to be exchanged was a key criterion in 
the mercantilist understanding of the balance between freedom and the 
protection of trade.12 The guiding principle of state intervention was the 
productive potential that was considered to be the most socially useful. 
While these early considerations were framed in the ‘lineage of the abso-
lutist State’13 and in an environment largely deprived of transborder 
services, apart from transport and merchant finance, their understanding 
of the relationship between market and non-market articulations in an 
internationalised economy were remarkably similar to Polanyi’s reflections 
on the intrinsic limits to the commodification of fictitious commodities 
10 K Blind, The Economics of Standards, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004) 167.
11 See Chapter 1 in this volume by Alexander Ebner.
12 C Perrotta, ‘Is the Mercantilist Theory of the Favorable Balance of Trade Really 
Erroneous?’, (1991) 23 History of Political Economy, 310–36. For further elaboration, see 
J-C Graz, ‘Transnational Mercantilism and the Emergent Global Trading Order’, (2004) 11 
Review of International Political Economy, 590–610.
13 P Anderson, The Lineage of the Absolutist State, (London: Verso Books, 1979).
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such as labour, land and money. To translate this understanding into the 
contemporary debate, the tension which exists when state practices in the 
area of non-market issues are put to the test by those involved in the trans-
national drive of capitalism can be referred to as a form of transnational 
mercantilism. The shift from a trade agenda focused on tariff reduction to 
the harmonisation of domestic regulations in consequence of their impact 
on international exchanges suggests that international standards play a 
crucial role in transnational mercantilism: they contribute to an acceptable 
balance between market and non-market provisions on a comprehensive 
scope and worldwide basis.
Against this background, standards are an object of enquiry which are 
closely related to globalisation studies, and highlight new patterns and 
agents of change beyond state and market power. Research on standards 
is dominated by business, economic, and applied science studies, which 
focus on industrial choices, market forces, and technological innovation.14 
A more political science-oriented perspective assumes that the drive for 
technical specification in international standardisation requires a distinct 
institutional framework to ensure some order at transnational level. Neo-
institutional approaches have tried to explain the nature of the relations 
between private actors involved in standardisation and the institutional 
environment in which their actions take place. Borrowing the concept 
of transaction costs from institutional economics, these studies consider 
how the practices of agents can be defined by their environments to a 
considerable extent. From this perspective, standardisation provides an 
institutional guarantee for improving trust in transactions and curbing 
the free-riding risks among actors not willing to pay the full cost of the 
expected benefits. Rational choice and game theories formalise systematic 
explanations of co-operative games and the conflicts of distribution in 
the institutional framework of standardisation.15 In this view, the logic of 
action trumps its content, and the understanding of the power relations 
involved in standardisation is confined to quantifiable and a priori defined 
criteria based upon rationalist assumptions.
14 RB Toth, The Economics of Standardization, (Minneapolis MN: Standards Engineering 
Society, 1984); CF Cargill, Information Technology Standardisation, (Bedford MA: Digital Press, 
1989); P Swann, The Economics of Standardization. Final Report for Standards and Technical 
Regulations Directorate Department of Trade and Industry, (Manchester: Manchester Business 
School, 2000); J Drèze, ‘The Standard Goods Hypothesis’ in A Jacquemin and A Sapir 
(eds), The European Internal Market, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); H de Vries, 
Standardization, (Boston MA: Kluwer, 1999); OECD, Regulatory Reform and International 
Standardisation (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trade 
Committee Working Party, 1999); Blind, note 10 above.
15 K Abbott and D Snidal, “International ‘standards’ and international governance”, 
(2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy, 345–70; Mattli note 3 above; W Mattli and T Büthe, 
‘Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?’, (2003) 56 
World Politics, 1–42.
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Other studies adopt a more critical perspective on the socially- and 
historically-constructed framework of standardisation and its diver-
sity across the globe. They provide accounts of the formation of the 
institutional architecture of standard-setting, the beliefs underpinning 
standards, their organisational environment, the democratic controls of 
the so-called independent regulatory authorities, the conflicts of power in 
specific negotiations, and the broader scope of ISO-like standards.16 Such 
analyses shed light, for instance, on the debate between the strongly insti-
tutionalised ISO and European systems, the more competitive pattern in 
the US, and the oligopolistic nature of consortia agreements.17 Yet their 
account fails to recognise the structural nature of the power relationships 
affected by standardisation and the role it plays in the organisation of a 
capitalist world economy.
The concept of structural power refers to material and discursive 
structures which are able to affect (intentionally and unintentionally) the 
practices of agents; hence, those able to wield this power can modify the 
general environment for their own benefit.18 The Schumpeter-inspired 
approach developed by Dudouet, Mercier and Vion highlights an impor-
tant point in this regard, as it uncovers how standards may re-inforce 
path-dependant oligopolistic innovation trajectories.19 However, it seems 
better suited to appraising innovation systems in technology than the 
increasing social scope and political implication of standards as exempli-
fied in a number of service standards. In addition, the approach is not 
meant to uncover the broader and structural power relations taking place 
in standardisation. The distinct practices of standardisation call to mind 
the nébuleuse that Cox portrayed in the mixture of official and unofficial 
transnational and international networks, with representatives of business, 
the state and academia working towards the formulation of a consensual 
policy for global capitalism.20 The structural power of standardisation 
epitomises one, among other, new forms of non-state authority that have 
evolved over the past decade in the global political economy. The scope 
16 Brunsson and Jacobsson, note 5 above; S Schmidt and R Werle, Coordination Technology, 
(Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1998).
17 K Nicolaïdis and M Egan, ‘Transnational market governance and regional policy exter-
nalities: why recognize foreign standards?’ (2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy, 454–73; 
M Egan, Constructing a European Market, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
18 S Gill and D Law, ‘Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital’, (1989) 33 
International Studies Quarterly, 475–99; S Guzzini, ‘The use and misuse of power analysis 
in international theory’, in R Palan (ed), Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, 
(London-New York: Routledge, 2000).
19 F-X Dudouet, D Mercier and A Vion, ‘Politiques internationales de normalisation: 
Quelques jalons pour la recherche empirique’, (2006) 56 Revue Française de science politique, 
367–92.
20 RW Cox, ‘Global Perestroïka’, in R Miliband and L Panitch (eds), Socialist Register, 
(London: Merlin Press, 1992).
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of international standards not only pertains to their potential worldwide 
reach, but also to the whole range of conflicts emanating from the capital-
ist system.21 Assessments of the relationship between standard-setting 
agencies and society as a whole are, therefore, bound to be controver-
sial. Thus, the rise of international standardisation as a privileged form 
of devising technical specification typically encroaches upon two core 
issues which crystallise social struggles in capitalism: the opposition 
between labour and capital, and the separation of the economy from 
the state. Standards intervene into the struggle between capital and 
labour. Workers may look to standards to ensure a safer workplace (for 
example, standards on machine safety or maximum noise pollution) or to 
obtain quality guarantees on the goods which they purchase. In contrast, 
entrepreneurs, merchants and financiers will equate standards with risk 
reduction, technological progress, strategic competitive behaviour, and 
profit. With regard to the separation between the economy and the state, 
the voluntary market-oriented dimension of standards may re-inforce 
free market claims to keep economic constraints and appropriation sepa-
rated from politico-legal coercion. At the same time, however, the author-
ity conferred on standard-setters by state agencies and intergovernmental 
agreements may narrow down the conventional Weberian view of state 
autonomy. This prompts us to elaborate further on how the rise of 
standards impinges upon bureaucratic practices and state law.
III. STANDARDISATION AND BUREAUCRACY
The larger scope of standards in the organisation of transnational markets 
substitutes, to a certain extent, the role of bureaucracies in the founda-
tions of authority and the domination of modern states in capitalism. 
As stressed by Joerges and Rödl with regard to the European context, 
standardisation ‘has detached itself from state law’, but, at the same 
time, ‘remains in contact with government actors’.22 A central assump-
tion of Weber’s analysis of modern state power is that any legal rational 
form of domination relies on functional differentiation in order to exer-
cise its power and claim legitimacy. To a large extent, such a functional 
differentiation rests upon the state bureaucracy. Civil servants provide 
a rational administration thanks to the stock of knowledge that they 
21 C Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1994); C Murphy and J Yates, note 4 above.
22 Ch Joerges and F Rödl, ‘Reconstituting democracy in Europe’s post-national constella-
tion by dint of conflict of laws’, in: I Lianos and O Odudu (eds), Regulating Trade in Services 
in the EU and the WTO: Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 326.
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acquired at school and subsequent professional training, as well as the 
skills and expertise built up throughout the years in which they occupy 
their positions. The supposed autonomy of the bureaucracy is identified 
as a guarantee against state capture from ruling élites as well as from all 
sorts of organised private and associative interests.23 A great number of 
studies have discussed over several decades how Weber may have over-
emphasised the efficiency of bureaucratic administration and its supposed 
monopoly of factual knowledge and technical expertise.24 Moreover, 
Weber’s disenchanted view on modern life, which would bring about an 
ineluctable spread of bureaucracy leaving no more space for individual 
freedom and creativity is, to a large extent, contradictory to his analysis 
of a knowledge-based administration as the bulwark of the collective 
good against the ability of private organised interests and government 
executives to capture the state.25 Finally, many problems may be related 
to the proliferation of autonomous administrative entities re-inforced by 
functional differentiation, be it a concentration of power at the top of the 
hierarchy, or the dominance of one rationality over all the others.26
However tricky the analysis of bureaucracy may be, standardisation 
challenges the conventional Weberian legal-rational view of organising 
state bureaucracies along distinct functional tasks relating to technical 
issues. Support for industry-based and timely voluntary standards is, 
indeed, often made on such claims as the lack of knowledge and expertise 
supposedly embodied by regulatory practices prompted by state agen-
cies. Standards would provide efficient rules for global co-ordination 
and help to clamp down on cumbersome inter-governmental regulatory 
agreements. As Schepel explains, from a legal pluralist approach ‘self reg-
ulation, in this conception, is no longer necessarily seen as an alternative 
to state regulation; rather, the regulation of self-regulation is conceived of 
as regulation by other means’.27
From this standpoint, standardisation looks like a comprehensive 
procedure that plays out various normative orders and levels of gover-
nance in order to provide structural coupling between fragmented social 
23 M Weber, Economie et société, (Paris: Pocket, 1995).
24 J Meyer and B Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structures as Myth and 
Ceremony’, (1977) 83 The American Journal of Sociology, 340–63; J Meyer et al, ‘World Society 
and the Nation-State’, (1997) 103 American Journal of Sociology, 144–81.
25 M Weber, ‘Parlement et gouvernement dans l’Allemagne réorganisée. Contribution à 
la critique politique du corps des fonctionnaires et du système des partis’, in M Weber (ed) 
Oeuvres politiques (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004).
26 G Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional 
Theory?’ in Ch Joerges, I-J Sand and G Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and 
Constitutionalism, (Oxford-Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2004); Ch Joerges and E Vos (eds), 
EU Committees, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
27 Schepel, note 7 above, 31.
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systems. It constitutes one of the pillars of a ‘global law without a state’.28 
Provided that society is fairly, substantially and thoroughly included, 
legal pluralism views standardisation as a blueprint for deliberative 
supranationalism which is likely to re-embed transnational markets with 
other means.29
However, far from coupling fragmented and differentiated social 
systems, the growing influence of standards is likely to undermine the 
functional differentiation of politics. The wide range of social forces 
which promote standards re-inforces the lack of distinction between 
an authority founded on scientific knowledge, technical expertise, and 
market power, on the one hand, and an authority built upon a formal 
mandate which establishes procedures for delegating the sovereign 
power of political subjects, on the other. Such functional differentiation 
strengthens the authority of non-state actors, founded on their expertise 
as well as on their market power, to the detriment of the cognitive author-
ity claimed by professional civil servants. At international level, non-state 
actors may obtain extra advantage from the absence of a supranational 
government. The decline of functional differentiation born with modern 
state power gives way to undifferentiated private and public bodies in 
charge of setting rules on issues indeterminately related to the sphere of 
hard science or societal values. This argument challenges the assumption 
made in most of the literature on the regulatory practices of non-elected 
bodies and private actors, which underestimates their ability to capture 
the state.30 Borraz has, for instance, re-assessed this assumption for the 
case of French standardisation in water utilities.31 Political capture should 
not be identified only in reference to outcomes and procedures. More 
structurally, it relates to a control of resources, access, and the capacity of 
actors to modify durably the environment of their practices to their own 
advantage. Part of the ability of non-elected bodies and private actors to 
capture supranational deliberative procedures relates to the ambiguous 
and ambivalent status of such non-state actors in international relations. 
Standards definition, implementation and monitoring may well be privi-
leged vehicles for exercising such a structural power.
28 Teubner note 8 above.
29 Schepel, note 7 above, 412–13.
30 Egan, Constructing a European Market, note 18 above; G Majone, ‘Two Logics of 
Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance’, (2001) 2 European Union 
Politics, 103–21; J Jordana and D Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation, (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005).
31 O Borraz, ‘Les normes: instrument dépolitisé de l’action publique’, in P Lascoumes and 
P Le Galès (eds), Gouverner par les instruments, (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2005).
International Standards and the Service Economy 219
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL HYBRID AUTHORITY OF STANDARDS
The growing influence of standards brings about a new form of transna-
tional hybrid authority in international relations. Both the nature and the 
implications of the rise of non-state actors as standard-setters who shape 
the global political economy call for new conceptual tools. This complex 
and multi-faceted process evolves extremely rapidly. It reflects the signifi-
cance of a phenomenon which I have elsewhere referred to as the rise of 
global hybrids. Global hybrids are defined as
a form of authority that blurs the subjects legitimately involved in it, pertains 
to objects undermining the distinction between science and society, and pur-
sues a fragmentation of the space where the endogenous logic of territorial 
sovereignty gives way to an exogenous logic reinforcing the transnational 
underpinning of capitalism.32
In the field of international relations, studies of private international 
authority have pioneered ground-breaking analysis in order to appraise 
the influence of a distinct type of non-state actor.33 They explain how inter-
firm co-operation can confer a political role on actors traditionally associ-
ated with the private sphere of economic transactions. They prompted a 
shared understanding on the importance of implicit or explicit consent—
instead of coercion or forceful compliance—in such configurations of 
power. According to Cutler and her co-authors, ‘those subject to the rules 
and decisions being made by private sector actors must accept them as 
legitimate, as the representations of experts and those “in authority”’.34 
The rise of non-state actors and less conventional forms of sovereignty is, 
however, not confined to the co-operation of firms across borders.35 Djelic 
and Sahlin-Andersson consider, for instance, that the non-state authority 
which enables various forms of transnational governance hinges upon 
‘powerful institutional forces that altogether constitute a transnational 
culture or meaning system’.36 Studies should not narrow down who may 
actually have such authority.
32 J-C Graz, ‘Hybrids and Regulation in the Global Political Economy’, (2006) 10 
Competition and Change, 230–45. For further elaboration, see also, J-C Graz, ‘Quand les normes 
font loi: topologie intégrée et processus différenciés de la normalisation internation ale’, 
(2004) XXV Etudes Internationales, 233–60; J-C Graz ‘International standardisation and cor-
porate democracy’, in K-G Giesen and K van der Pijl (eds), Global Norms in the Twenty-First 
Century, note 5 above.
33 Cutler, Haufler and Porter, note 6 above.
34 Ibid, 19.
35 Graz and Nölke, note 8 above; E Grande and L Pauly (eds), Complex sovereignty, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); RB Hall and T Biersteker (eds), The Emergence 
of Private Authority in Global Governance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
S Strange, The Retreat of the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
36 M-L Djelic and K Sahlin-Andersson (eds), Transnational Governance, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 23.
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The range of private actors to be taken into consideration undoubtedly 
depends on how we define the private/public distinction. While accounts 
may vary in each society, the separation between the modern state and 
the economy has shaped social relations along the distinction between 
the private and the public sphere. The two spheres should be analysed 
as being closely related, reflecting two faces of the same coin. While the 
public sphere confers inclusive and universalistic rights of citizenship, 
the private sphere brings into play exclusive and bounded contractual 
rights. Non-state actors span both spheres, as exemplified by trade unions, 
activist groups, women’s organisations, professional associations, cadres 
and experts organised in ad hoc bodies, advocacy or policy networks, 
élite clubs and religious groups. In each case, the range of private actors 
is greater than firms—which we refer to as the ‘private sector’ in narrow 
economic terms.
The distinction between the private and public spheres in which stan-
dardisation practices take place may, therefore, be seen as located in an 
institutional continuum which defines who can standardise. Both market 
mechanisms and policy choices affect the agents involved in the field, 
although they do so in different ways. Technical specifications belong to 
the private sphere of economic activities governed by market constraints, 
and affect social and technological change from that angle. They nonethe-
less remain related to the public sphere of political action directed at the 
general interest of society—for instance, by determining a certain level of 
risk or by setting principles of liability. Hence, even in the circumscribed 
field of technical specification, norms relate as much to capital accumula-
tion and technical progress as to social improvement or the various instru-
ments of the welfare state.
Moreover, the ability of non-state actors to co-operate across borders in 
order to establish rules and standards which are accepted as legitimate 
by agents not involved in their definition, requires explicit or implicit 
state recognition. A critical source of non-state authority in the global 
political economy is, therefore, what Sassen calls ‘de-nationalisation’, 
that is, the process which contributes to the endogeneisation of private 
and transnational agendas within the public sphere.37 Governments and 
intergovernmental institutions often support and fully recognise the 
power of non-state actors, who, in turn, may gain legitimate authority. 
The territorial basis of politics, of the state, and of the structural power 
of governments and markets still exists beyond various forms of trans-
national private governance. It is against this background that particular 
attention must be paid to the mixture of private and public actors in 
37 S Sassen, ‘The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance’, (2003) 10 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 5–28; idem, Territory, Authority, Rights, note 5 above.
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standardisation, and to the reasons why these standards become 
effective.
The transnational hybrid authority of standards entails numerous 
agents who play or claim to play a role not only as new subjects (private/
public actors), but also on the nature of the objects (natural/societal) upon 
which exerting their power. The authority conferred on standards changes 
the properties of these categories and alters the hierarchy of their relation-
ship. Regarding the distinct classes of the objects concerned, technical 
specifications are situated along a material continuum which delineates 
what can be standardised. Taken as a whole, the continuum gives sup-
port to standards likely to aggregate any relation between human beings 
and nature. The so-called technical specifications range from natural 
and invariable physical measures to constructed and historically-bound 
societal values. The increasingly large scale of capitalist industries and 
the rapid technological innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution 
led to material product standards defining performance and inter-
operability. Health and safety concerns linked to the welfare state 
prompted the development of standards in domains more directly related 
to consumers than producers. More recently, outsourcing in the develop-
ment of global value chains and increasing concerns about environmental 
regulations potentially used as non-tariff trade barriers contributed to 
the shift towards quality and environmental management standards in 
the 1980s and 1990s. International standardisation is now bound to make 
headway into even broader societal concerns, which are tackled by the 
implication of the intangible and relational features of some aspects of the 
service sector. In a context of technological convergence, the disaggrega-
tion of productive processes, privatisation, and growing foreign competi-
tion triggered by the offshoring of services, the material continuum along 
which privileged objects to be standardised are situated, reproduces the 
hierarchy of the North–South divide. Apart from a few exceptions in large 
emerging countries, international standards are not widely spread in 
developing economies, where services nevertheless account for half of the 
economic activity; and when they are, developing countries are standard 
users—not makers. A very limited number of standards concern issues 
of distinct relevance to developing countries, such as those related to the 
cross-border trade of second-hand goods discussed in the recently created 
ISO Technical Committee 245 under the auspices of the Standardisation 
Administration of China.
To sum up, drawing upon the assumption that globalisation involves 
new patterns and agents of change through formal and informal regula-
tory practices of a wide range of nonstate actors, service standards reflect 
the significant development of a form of transnational hybrid authority 
that blurs the distinction between private and public actors, whose scope 
spread all along from physical measures to societal values, and which 
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reinforces the deterritorialisation of regulatory practices in contemporary 
capitalism. It is now time to further explore the institutional setting of the 
emerging power of service standards.
V. THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF SERVICE STANDARDS
The entry into force of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement and the revision of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) Agreement in 1995 validated a formal devolution of power to 
international standard-setting organisations. Unlike the loose provi-
sions regarding technical regulation of the old GATT, the TBT and SPS 
Agreements, like some provisions of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) and the plurilateral Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA Article VI: 2b), give international standards a major 
role in harmonising the technical specifications of goods and services 
traded on the global market. State regulation in this domain must com-
ply with ‘legitimate objectives’. With regard to goods, such concerns 
are related to health, safety and environmental issues. In contrast, com-
petence, capacity to deliver, and quality are the major objectives in the 
sphere of services. The goal of removing ‘unnecessary’ barriers to trade 
should, furthermore, be pursued so far as possible by substituting interna-
tional standards for domestic standards. GATS Article VI: 4 assigns to the 
Council for Trade and Services (through its Working Party on Domestic 
Regulation) the largely market-inspired task of developing ‘any necessary 
discipline’ to ensure that domestic regulations ‘do not constitute unneces-
sary barriers to trade [and are] not more burdensome than necessary to 
ensure the quality of the services’. The agreement furthermore specifies 
that ‘account shall be taken of international standards of relevant inter-
national organizations’ determining whether a Member is in conformity 
with such discipline (GATS Article VI: 5b). Since the launching of services 
negotiations in 2000 independently from the so-called Doha development 
agenda, no decision has been reached within the WTO on further defining 
discipline in the global market for services. Despite the careful wording 
of the WTO,38 a whole range of international bodies still has the capacity 
to define generic as well as detailed technical specifications which affect 
how swelling offshore services are expected to be traded on a worldwide 
basis.
38 In a footnote, the Agreement specifies that ‘the term “relevant international organiza-
tions” refers to international bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at 
least all Members of the WTO’.
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A. The ISO Setting
As the world’s largest developer and publisher of international standards 
with a membership of 160 mixed private and public national standar-
disation bodies, the ISO represents a core arena for assessing the current 
developments of service standardisations. The move into the standardi-
sation of services was kicked-off in 1995 by a COPOLCO (Committee on 
Consumer Policy of the International Organization for Standardization) 
workshop that took place in Beijing. Lawrence Eicher, then ISO Secretary 
General, emphasised that the manufacturing industry was already chang-
ing with the move into generic management system standards, and, from 
here on, ‘the emphasis could change even more to take into account the 
needs of the burgeoning service industries’.39 Six workshops took place 
in the following years with various foci, such as tourism, exhibition man-
agement, banking and insurance, and engineering consultancy, as well as 
multi-sectoral methodological issues for developing service standards. 
In 2001, a new working group was established to draft a guide on the 
use and development of service standards from a consumers’ perspec-
tive. After seven years of intense negotiations, the ‘ISO/IEC Guide 76, 
Development of service standards—Recommendations for addressing 
consumer issues’ was eventually published in January 2008. So far, 14 
new technical or project committees have been set up to develop service 
standards at the ISO.40 Some developments have taken place with regard 
to the requirements for professionals who provide personal financial 
planning such as in pensions per capitalisation (ISO 22222:2005), in the 
vocabulary and service requirements for market, opinion and social 
research (ISO 20252:2006), in safety requirements for scuba diving (ISO 
24801-1:2007), and as a first attempt to develop a common terminology 
for defining hotels and other types of tourism accommodation (ISO 
18513:2003). These distinct sectoral standards remain marginal in terms of 
the global service economy. Clearly, large portions of the service economy, 
such as finance and insurance, use instruments developed within their 
own sector, even if their ability to legitimately claim a large authority in 
39 ISO Bulletin, January 1995.
40 New ISO committees specifically focused on services standards are extremely diverse 
as the following list demonstrates: ISO/TC 204, Intelligent transport system; ISO/TC 215, 
Health Informatics; ISO/TC 222 Personal Financial Planning; ISO/TC 223 Societal Security; 
ISO/TC 224 Service activities relating to drinking water supply system and wastewater 
systems; ISO/TC 225 Market, opinion and social research; ISO/TC 228 Tourism and 
related services; ISO/TC 230 Project Committee: Psychological assessment; ISO/TC 231 
Project Committee: Brand valuation; ISO/TC 232 Educational Services; ISO/TC 235 Project 
Committee: Rating services; ISO/TC 236 Project Committee: Project Management; ISO/TC 
237 Project committee: Exhibition terminology; ISO/TC 239 Project committee: Network 
services billing.
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self-regulation has been seriously challenged in the context of the global 
economic crisis. Transborder service providers also heavily rely on more 
generic standards, which may be indifferently applied in both the produc-
tion and the exchange of goods and services. Among those most widely 
used are the quality, environmental, and information security manage-
ment system standards ISO 9000, 14000 and 27000 series, as well as the 
guidance on conformity assessment provided by the ISO 17000 series.
More than five years after the 2005 ISO workshop ‘Global trade in 
services—new challenges for international standardization’ and almost 
two decades after the launching of the institutional process, little prog-
ress has been accomplished within the ISO. While some of these early 
developments may later have profound impact on the service sector, it 
is worth noting that, so far, maturity in service standardisation remains 
weak within the ISO environment.
B. The European Setting
More developments take place at the regional level, especially in Europe, 
as the European Union is at the forefront of both service integration and 
international standardisation.41 In 1985, Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 
on a ’New Approach’ to technical harmonisation and standardisation 
instigated a completely new regulatory technique and strategy.42 The 
resolution was a response to the growing role of the European Court of 
Justice in solving conflicting regulatory policies in the internal European 
market. It was also an early move towards the completion of the Single 
Market by devising procedures to avoid turning technical specifications 
into a structural impediment to trade. Although Member States were 
wary about seeing regulation in this domain transferred to the European 
authorities, they did perceive the threat of a race to the bottom in public-
purpose standards as integration progressed. The New Approach pro-
vides a framework for the harmonisation of EU public law only on the 
general and essential requirements of goods and services traded on the 
European market, in particular, in the field of health, the environment, 
safety, and consumer protection. Depending on the sectors affected, 
41 There are regional standardisation bodies in the Americas (Pan American Standards 
Commission, COPANT) and in Asia-Pacific (Pacific Area Standards Congress, PASC). As 
compared to the European system, however, their influence is still weak.
42 For a discussion of the increasing reliance on standardisation in European law making 
and public policy from a deliberative suprationalist perspctive, see Ch Joerges, H Schepel 
and E Vos, ‘The Law’s Problems with the Involvement of Non-Governmental Actors in 
Europe’s Legislative Process: The Case of Standardisation under the “New Approach”’, (EUI 
Working Paper LAW, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 1999).
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technical specifications, performance criteria and quality requirements 
are either based upon mutual recognition of national standards, or 
delegated to European standard-setting bodies such as CEN (Comité euro-
péen de normalisation), CENELEC (Comité européen de normalisation 
électrotechnique), and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute). In most sectors, the procedure for monitoring standards is a 
matter of business self-regulation, since products put on the market are 
granted a presumption of conformity through the sole declaration of the 
manufacturer (the CE marking). Thus, the European New Approach has 
not merely strengthened the importance of voluntary standards in the 
Single Market. By avoiding costly third-party testing and certification, 
and by providing the procedural means for a simultaneous adoption of 
European standards as international ones (through the so-called Dresden 
and Vienna Agreements), the EU has also won over non-European coun-
tries to its standardisation system. This (largely unintended) outcome 
has led to a powerful strategic positioning of European standards in the 
global market.43
The European Commission is well aware that the emergence of an 
increasingly dense and extensive European standardisation complex with 
global reach should also be able to support the Lisbon Agenda agreed at 
the European Council meeting in March 2000. Services are a core feature 
of the Lisbon Agenda, which aims ‘to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’. New emphasis on 
service standards occurred after the 2005 mid-term review of the Lisbon 
Agenda and the developments leading to the adoption of Directive 
2006/123/EC on services in the Internal Market, the so-called Bolkestein 
Directive eventually agreed upon at its second reading in December 2006 
and fully implemented since the end of 2009. A horizontal approach to the 
harmonisation of different regulations at European level lies at the centre 
of this directive, which aims to minimise the limits to the free movement 
of services and service providers by discrimination based upon nationality 
or local residence. The controversial ‘country of origin’ principle has now 
been substituted for the formula ‘freedom to provide services’. The service 
must conform to the regulations of his or her ‘place of establishment’. But, 
in order to further unify the internal market for services, the Directive 
sees the promotion of quality as a key objective. To this end, it explicitly 
encourages the work of professional independent or community bodies 
of standard-development and certification (such as CEN, CENELEC, and 
ETSI) in order to develop voluntary quality marks and labels (Preamble 
102 and Article 26).
43 Egan, Constructing a European Market, note 18 above; D Vogel, Trading Up, (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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It is against such a background that DG Enterprise and Industry of the 
European Commission addressed, in October 2003, its first Programming 
mandate (M 340) to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the field of services in 
order to identify priority sectors in which intra-community trade in ser-
vices was already occurring or was likely to surge. Issues could include 
horizontal cross-sectoral generic standards and vertical sector-specific 
standards, as well as service providers or end-users. After several events 
organised in 2004 in response to this mandate, a second programming 
mandate (M 371) was addressed to CEN in the field of services in 2005 
following the transfer of responsibility for business-related services to DG 
Internal Market and Services. In 2007, 11 projects were developed among 
half a dozen European standardisation bodies in response to this second 
mandate.
The CEN Horizontal European Service Standardization Strategy 
(CHESSS) is the largest of the 11 projects formed in response to EU 
Mandate M/371. This initiative is organised as a consortium of national 
standards bodies led by the British Standards Institute (BSI), in associa-
tion with those from Spain (AENOR), Germany (DIN), Denmark (DS), 
Estonia (EVS) and the Netherlands (NEN), as well as participation from 
CapGemini, one of the world leader in IT consulting and management ser-
vices. The initiative examined the feasibility of taking a generic approach to 
European service standardisation, in focusing on the extent to which stan-
dardisation could apply across multiple service sectors and the benefits of 
doing so, as opposed to following a sector-specific approach. By taking a 
generic approach, CHESSS seeks to establish the underlying principles for 
an ongoing programme of European service standardisation capable of 
facilitating the delivery of services across the EU, unimpeded by national 
borders.44 In its final report published in 2009, CHESSS formulates five 
recommendations.45 In addition to the development of a single generic 
European service standard, it supports the establishment of a guidance 
document for drafting future standards, the creation of a standardised 
Pan-European Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI), the clarification of ser-
vices glossary and equivalence issues, and the elaboration of a guidance 
document for customer centricity and interface. The topics expected to be 
included in a future single horizontal standard are confined to the design 
of the service, information provision to customers, billing, complaints 
and redress, as well as innovation and review. Unsurprisingly, the report 
points out the likely difficulty of involving a wide range of stakeholders 
44 Quincy Lissaur, Senior Business Consultant, BSI-British Standards, interview with the 
author, London, 23 January 2007.
45 CHESSS Consortium, Consolidated Report on the Feasibility Study in Response to EU 
Mandate M/371.
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when a lot of them lack the necessary awareness and resources to do so. 
This clearly bodes no good to the expected deliberative quality in the pro-
duction of such a standard. It is worth noting, however, that, throughout 
the modules, significant differences exist with regard to the approach to 
horizontal standards: some are in favour of multiple horizontal standards 
as opposed to a single horizontal standard; some prefer horizontal stan-
dards completed by vertical standards, while others remain very sceptical 
about the capacity of horizontal standards to deal with the diversity of the 
service economy. A distinct module of the report focused on business to 
business (B2B) services even suggests a so-called ABC-standard system 
as a suitable response to the antagonism between horizontal generic stan-
dards and vertical sectoral standards. (The idea would be to establish an 
institutional hierarchy between different types of standards, A-standards 
being for all services, B-standards or semi-horizontal standards for a 
group of services, and C-standards being sector specific.) By and large, 
it remains unclear whether the CHESSS strategy will be successful; how-
ever, the interest in a single horizontal generic standard with a possible 
certification scheme is clearly an attempt to promote services standards 
on a par with the worldwide achievement of the ISO 9000 series.
In contrast, the other ten projects address the specificity of distinct 
markets of services. As a pioneer in national standards developed and 
supported by private and public service providers in well-defined service 
sectors, AFNOR, the French national standardisation body, initiated these 
projects in consultation with a few European standardisation bodies, in 
particular, those from the Netherlands and Denmark. The recommenda-
tions made in the final report on the feasibility of European service stan-
dards thus identify a number of service activities likely to be standardised 
at various levels of institutionalisation, be they European Standards 
per se, or guidance materials and workshop agreements.46 The quality of 
the deliberation process is an important rationale in defending the supe-
riority of a vertical and sectoral approach. According to Pascal Gautier, in 
charge of the unit management and services at AFNOR, generic standards 
in services would soon become burdensome and unrealistic as ‘they 
require phenomenal efforts which would eventually generate opposition’; 
in his view, ‘it is much better to privilege a niche approach in service stan-
dards so as to keep a sector-specific proximity, to privilege in other words 
46 CEN Management Centre, Summary, Background and Proposals related to European 
Commission Programming Mandate M/371 in the Field of Services (April 2009). According to 
the Report, standardisation work should be initiated in the following areas: accessibility of 
transport and tourist services, project management services in the field of engineering con-
sultancy, services for residential homes and older persons, reception services, IT- and non-IT 
service outsourcing, and smart house services.
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a so-called Swiss army knife effect where each blade has its distinct use’.47 
However, the ability to capture deliberative standardisation processes 
remains important as long as the ambiguous mixture of private and public 
actors involved is not curbed and the issues concerned continue to be 
ambivalent with regard to their societal or more strictly technical objects 
of reference. In this regard, a narrower sectoral approach is certainly not 
a sufficient condition for securing standards which would become alter-
nate instruments of auto-protection of society. A proper differentiation of 
actors among stakeholders and issues spanning from physical measures 
to societal values, as well as clear-cut incentives to mitigate representa-
tion biases would be necessary to ensure a fair, substantial and thorough 
representation in standardisation processes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The picture emerging from the ongoing institutional developments 
at European and worldwide ISO level suggests that the transnational 
hybrid authority of international standards in the service sector will 
have a growing influence on the regulatory environment of the econ-
omy and society at large. Such developments remain, however, more 
difficult than commonly expected, and are supported by two sets of 
competing profiles. Those in favour of horizontal standards endorse 
the development of generic specifications cutting across distinct sectors 
and dis-embedding transnational markets thanks to narrow definitions 
of requirements such as transparency and quality. In contrast, sup-
porters of vertical standards claim that the internationalisation of the 
service economy should remain embedded in concrete market practices, 
labour processes, and, arguably, society at large. In their view, services 
can only be standardised according to the specificity of the production 
configuration in which they are provided and the context of their usage. 
While the motto of the former is what Ziva Patir, ex-Vice President of 
ISO, calls the 1-1-1-dream of ‘one market, one standard, one test, glob-
ally accepted’,48 the latter are more inclined to restrict such a motto to 
‘one sector, one standard, one test, accepted wherever relevant’. From a 
Polanyian perspective, these conflicting claims reflect opposing types of 
relationships between standards and society at large. As Ebner stresses 
in this volume, the double movement of commodification and auto-
protection of society should be understood as overlapping moments in 
which dis-embedding and re-embedding forces reflect clashes of social 
47 Pascal Gautier, Head of Unit ‘Management and Services’, AFNOR, interview with the 
author, Paris, 18 April 2007.
48 Ziva Patir, ISO Vice President, interview with the author, Geneva, 8 June 2007.
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principles, contradictory market systems and non-market modes of 
social integration. Similarly, international standards can be used either 
as driving forces for broadening the domain of market self-regulation, 
or as alternate instruments of auto-protection of society. The direction 
on which the balance will tilt depends on the degree to which society 
is fairly, substantially and thoroughly included in standardisation pro-
cesses; it is also subject to the differentiation of issues likely to be appro-
priate for such alternate tools of market organisation. 

